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Background and aims: Precommitment refers to the ability to prospectively restrict the access to temptations. This
study examined whether risk-taking during gambling is decreased when an individual has the opportunity to
precommit to his forthcoming bet.Methods: Sixty individuals participated in a gambling task that consisted of direct
choice (simply chose one monetary option among four available ones, ranging from low-risk to high-risk options) or
precommitment trials (before choosing an amount, participants had the opportunity to make a binding choice that
made high-risk options unavailable). Results:We found that participants utilized the precommitment option, such that
risk-taking was decreased on precommitment trials compared to direct choices. Within the precommitment trials,
there was no signiﬁcant difference in risk-taking following decisions to restrict versus non-restrict. Discussion: These
ﬁndings suggest that the opportunity to precommit may be sufﬁcient to reduce the attractiveness of risk. Conclusions:
Present results might be exploited to create interventions aiming at enhancing one’s ability to anticipate self-control
failures while gambling.
Keywords: gambling, risk-taking, precommitment, self-control, punishment sensitivity
INTRODUCTION
Not all risk-taking is created equal: some risks are taken
under a clear and rational frame of mind, while others are
made in a less planful fashion (Helﬁnstein et al., 2014). A
major issue with spontaneous risk-taking is that it is taken in
the “heat of the moment”, without more “cooler” elaborated
cognitive control, which may, in turn, hamper one’s ability
to pursue risk appropriately (Cohen & Lieberman, 2010;
Knoch et al., 2006). Put differently, inducing cautiousness
before deciding might enhance cognitive control, and in
turn, would reduce the level of risk-taking. For instance,
monetary risk-taking is diminished when imposing a delay
before the next bet, as compared to a situation in which
participants could bet directly (Newman, Patterson, &
Kosson, 1987; Thompson & Corr, 2013, 2014). Others
studies have shown that monetary risk-taking is lowered
in a gambling context in which participants were required to
stop their motor response (i.e., choosing a bet option), as
compared to a condition without stop signals (Stevens et al.,
2015; Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012).
Another possible alternative for diminishing impulsive
risk-taking would be to allow people to precommit to their
forthcoming choice. Precommitment refers to the ability to
anticipate self-control failures and prospectively restrict the
access to temptations (Fujita, 2011; Kalenscher & Pennartz,
2008; Kurth-Nelson & Redish, 2010, 2012). Findings from
several studies highlighted that precommitment is an efﬁ-
cient strategy to resist short-term temptations in order to
achieve long-term goals (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002;
Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2006; Giné, Karlan, & Zinman,
2010; Schwartz et al., 2014; Wertenbroch, 1998). These
studies have shown that precommitment could help people
to restrict themselves from (e.g.) smoking (Giné et al., 2010)
or eating unhealthy food (Schwartz et al., 2014). For
instance, individuals who agreed to pledge that they would
increase their purchases of healthy food (at some risk of
ﬁnancial loss if the goal was not reached) subsequently
showed an increase in healthy grocery items purchased, as
compared with individuals who declined the commitment
(Schwartz et al., 2014). This restriction process was framed
on a single precommitment decision phase (e.g., to choose
or not to precommit to a grocery-shopping program;
Schwartz et al., 2014), separated from hours, days or even
weeks from the actual temptation. Hence, while those
studies highlighted that precommitment could reduce the
incidence of self-control failure on several types of beha-
viors, this research only covers a certain type of situations
where precommitment could impact decision-making. More
speciﬁcally, studies are needed in order to examine the
impact of pre-commitment processes that allow people to
restrict themselves when choices are made repeatedly within
the “heat of the moment”, that is, on a trial-per-trial basis in
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which an individual has the opportunity to precommit his/
her forthcoming decision, such as during monetary risk-
taking in gambling.
The trial-per-trial impact of precommitment was recently
studied within an experiential delay-discounting task
(Crockett et al., 2013), where the opportunity to make a
binding choice was more effective at promoting selection
of the larger-later option than a ‘willpower’ condition that
was required sustained inhibitory control. These ﬁndings led
us to hypothesize that precommitment could also impact
sequential decision-making that involves probabilistic re-
wards, that is, gambling. Precommitment strategies are
already provided within casino-settings to individuals who
want to limit their level of monetary expense prior to
gambling (Nower & Blaszczynski, 2010). For instance,
gamblers can deposit predetermined amounts of money on
“smart cards” or can also gamble on slot machines that
enforce pre-set limits of money expense, after which the
machine deactivates (Ladouceur, Blaszczynski, & Lalande,
2012; Nower & Blaszczynski, 2010). Nevertheless, the
recent expansion of the gambling computer technology has
facilitated and diversiﬁed the access to situations involving
high monetary risk-taking (e.g., online poker, sport betting;
Khazaal et al., 2013; Petry &Weinstock, 2007). Indeed, recent
advances in online sport betting not only allow to place bets on
several ongoing live sport competitions but also to bet on
speciﬁc events occurring during the game. Hence, one major
issue with the online gambling environment is that it may
increase the development of abnormal monetary risk-taking
by affording much faster response times as the usual con-
straints of casino settings (e.g., time delay to get to the casino,
various delays imposed by the actions of other gamblers,
presence of a dealer). In this context, it is important to examine
whether precommitment could help one to restrict himself
when the temptation is closer in time and occur repeatedly
over a certain period of time.
The action of “gambling” in the present study consisted
of choosing one of four monetary amounts. Participants
were informed that the higher the amount, the less probable
a win and than a loss corresponded to half of the amount
they gambled with. Thus, selecting higher amounts consti-
tuted a more risky bet, whereas selecting lower amounts
constituted a safer bet (but without having explicit informa-
tion on win/loss probability). Risk-taking in our task con-
sisted of preferring relatively higher amounts that carried
a higher probability of losing (and in the case of the risk-
iest options, a negative expected value) over lower amounts
that carried a lower probability of losing (Boyer, 2006;
Verbruggen et al., 2012). This is the same behavior that
problem gamblers engage in, for example, sport betting. In
this context, self-control refers here as the ability to sacriﬁce
the opportunity to experience high monetary reward in favor
of lower but less risky rewards, that is, acting consistently
with one’s more abstract distal motivation (e.g., to win
money at the end of the experiment; Boyer et al., 2006;
Fujita, 2011). Self-control failure, on the other hand, entails
sacriﬁcing one’s distal concerns of long-term monetary
gains in favor of the possibility of enjoying higher but less
probable reward (e.g., risk-seeking choice), that is, acting in
a manner consistent with one’s concrete, proximal incentive
(Dill & Holton, 2014; Fujita, 2011). Hence, each trial of our
gambling paradigm triggers a self-control conﬂict because
the participant’s distal and proximal motivations pressed for
opposing actions. Using this gambling paradigm, we expected
that participants would take less risk (i.e., enhanced self-
control) when they have the opportunity to precommit to their
forthcoming bet, that is, to make a binding choice that turns
high-risk bet unavailable for choice, as compared with situa-
tions in which participants can gamble directly.
Finally, an exploratory aim of this study was to examine
whether the association between sensitivity to reward, sen-
sitivity to punishment and risk-taking could be modulated
by the type of trials (precommitment or direct choice).
Indeed, some studies highlighted that sensitivity to reward
and to punishment is predictive of monetary risk-taking
(Franken &Muris, 2005; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de Beurs, &
van den Brink, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2011; Studer & Clark,
2011; Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). More speciﬁcally, in risky
choice situations, high sensitivity to punishment should
promote avoidance of potential losses and thereby lead to
risk-averse behavior. In contrast, sensitivity to reward might
lead to risk-seeking behavior. In this study, we examined
whether precommitment could have a “protective” effect
on the impact of sensitivity to punishment and reward on
monetary risk-taking. Hence, we expected that risk-taking
will negatively correlate with sensitivity to punishment, and
positively correlate with sensitivity to reward for the direct
choice trials, but not for the precommitment trials.
METHODS
Participants
Sixty undergraduate students from the University of South-
ern California (USC), College of Letters, Art, and Sciences
participated in this study (see Table 1 for participants’
characteristics).
Table 1. Demographical data and scores on the BIS/BAS (reward sensitivity) and the SOGS in the Precommitment First (PF), the Direct
Choice First (DCF) and the Intermittent Precommitment (IP) conditions
PF DCF IP Test statistics
n 20 20 20
Male/Female 10/10 10/10 10/10
Age 20.83(2.28) 20.40(1.64) 21.20(2.54) F(59) = 0.62, p = .54
BIS 15.00(3.41) 13.10(3.67) 14.45(2.18) F(59) = 1.91, p = .16
BAS reward sensitivity 8.30(2.20) 7.60(2.09) 7.55(2.24) F(59) = 0.743, p = .48
SOGS 0.50(0.88) 0.90(1.02) 0.75(1.06) F(59) = 0.082, p = .44
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Gambling task
Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch LCD monitor against a
black background. The task was run using E-Prime 2.0
Professional. The current procedure was based on a previous
study by Crockett et al. (2013), and it consisted of two types
of trials: direct choice and precommitment trials. During the
direct choice trials (see Figure 1a), participants simply chose
one monetary gamble from four available options by press-
ing the “f”, “g”, “h” or “j” key on the keyboard. During the
precommitment trials (see Figure 1b), participants had, ﬁrst,
to decide whether to restrict their forthcoming choice. If
participants chose to precommit, the two riskier options
were made unavailable (i.e., crossed-out, see Figure 1b). If
participants chose not to commit, they faced a choice
situation in which the four amounts were available. For the
half of the trials, the situation depicting the two crossed-out
options was displayed on the left of the screen, and the
situation with the four available options was displayed on
the right of the screen, with these positions reversed for the
other half of the trials. Participants chose the situation they
wanted to face with left- and right-button presses via the
keys “1” and “2” of the keyboard, respectively. Across each
trial, the four choice options were randomly chosen among
the following amounts (depicted in ¢; expected value, EV,
were based on Verbruggen et al., 2012): 100 [pwin = .90;
EV = 85], 200 [pwin = .80; EV = 140], 400 [pwin = .70;
EV = 220], 600 [pwin = .50; EV = 150], 700 [pwin =
.40; EV = 70], 900 [pwin = .30; EV = −450], 1000
[pwin = .20; EV = −2000]. A loss corresponded to the half
of the amount selected (e.g., corresponding loss for the ¢100
amount corresponded to ¢−50). The amounts were aligned
in a random order to prevent choices from being driven by
spatial-attention or response-bias effects (which might oc-
cur, for example, if higher amounts were consistently pre-
sented on the right of the screen).
In total, there were 50 direct choice trials and 50 pre-
commitment trials. There was no decision-time limit. Each
trial was separated by a ﬁxation cross (1000 ms). The
succession between direct choice trials and precommitment
trials differed across three between-subjects conditions:
“Direct Choice First” (DCF), “Precommitment First” (PF),
and “Intermittent Precommitment” (IP). In the DCF condi-
tion, 50 direct choice trials were followed by 50 precom-
mitment trials. In the PF condition, 50 precommitment trials
were followed by 50 direct choice trials. The IP condition
consisted of a random succession of direct choice trials
Figure 1. (a) An example of direct choice trial. After seeing a ﬁxation cross (1000 ms), participants simply chose between four options
associated with different monetary amounts and received a feedback (2000 ms), either a win or a loss. A loss corresponds to the half of the
amount selected. (b) An example of precommitment trial. After seeing a ﬁxation cross (1000 ms), participants have to decide whether to face
(i) a choice situation in which the four-choice options are available or either (ii) a situation in which the two riskier options are made
unavailable (crossed-out options). After choosing the situation they want to face, they choose an amount and then receive a feedback
(2000 ms), either a win or a loss
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(n = 50) and precommitment trials (n = 50). This between-
groups condition was implemented to our design in order to
control for the possibility that the impact of trial types
(precommitment vs. direct choice) on risk-taking interacts
with a speciﬁc dynamic of trials order presentation. Parti-
cipants were divided equally between the DCF (n = 20), the
PF (n = 20) and the IP conditions (n = 20) and were paired
on gender across each condition (see Table 1). The number
of participants to include was set a priori based on previous
studies examining the effect of situational factors on mone-
tary risk-taking (Thompson & Corr, 2013, 2014; Verbruggen
et al., 2012). New participants were tested until that number
was reached.
For each participant, index of risk-taking was ﬁrst cal-
culated on a trial-by-trial basis which corresponded to the
value of the amount selected multiplied by the range of risk-
taking [range = 1, 2, 3 or 4; when 1 corresponded to the
smallest amount, which had the highest probability of
winning (the safest bet) and 4 to the highest amount, which
had the lowest probability of winning (the riskiest bet)].
These indices (range = 100–4000) were then averaged
separately for the 50 direct choice trials and the 50 precom-
mitment trials. Higher scores indicate higher risk-taking.
Reward and punishment sensitivity
The BIS/BAS self-report scale was administered (Carver &
White, 1994). This scale measures affective responses to
impending rewards (BAS) or punishments (BIS) and con-
tains 20 items with a four-point Likert scale ranging from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. The BAS items are
divided into three subcategories: BAS drive, BAS reward
sensitivity, and BAS fun seeking. The BIS subscale has no
subcategories and measures only punishment sensitivity.
The BIS subscale (seven items) and the BAS reward sen-
sitivity subscale (ﬁve items) were used in this study because
our primary research goal was to measure the inﬂuence of
reward and punishment sensitivity on monetary risk-taking.
Adequate reliability for the BIS punishment sensitivity
subscale (Cronbach’s α = 0.74) and for the BAS reward
sensitivity subscale (Cronbach’s α = 0.70) was established
in this study.
Problem gambling severity
We used the 20-item South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS;
Lesieur & Blume, 1987) to evaluate the participants’
gambling-related behavior and problems. The SOGS is a
widely used screening instrument for problem gambling
and shows good reliability and validity in the community
and clinical samples (Lesieur & Blume, 1987). A total SOGS
score of 5 or higher is typically used to classify probable
pathological gambling (with scores between 1 and 4 indicat-
ing some problems with gambling; Lesieur & Blume, 1987).
Procedure
After having signed an IRB-approved informed consent
form, all participants (N = 60) received the same task
instructions and were ignorant about the logic of trials
succession order. They were informed that the probability
of winning decreased as the amount increased and that a loss
corresponded to the half of the amount selected. Each
participant received a ﬁxed remuneration of $5, and another
$5 to gamble with. The two $5 bills were placed next to the
experimenter’s computer so that the participant could see it.
Subjects were informed that, at the end of the experiment,
their total amount will be added (if > ¢0) or subtracted
(if < ¢0) from their $5 gambling balance. At the end of each
trial (i.e., after choosing an amount), participants were told
how much they had won or lost (2000 ms), but they received
no information about their current balance during the task.
The experiment started with a short practice phase that con-
sisted of two direct choice trials and two precommitment
trials. Directly after the task completion, participants were
given the total amount won or lost during the task. They
were then asked to ﬁll out the BIS/BAS scale and the SOGS.
Ethics
The study procedures were carried out in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. Each participant gave informed
consent to the experimental procedure, which was approved
by the USC Institutional Review Board. Participants re-




Participants from the DCF, the PF and the IP conditions
were similar in age, sensitivity to reward (scores on the
BAS reward sensitivity subscale from the BIS/BAS) and
sensitivity to punishment (scores on the BIS scale from the
Table 2. Risk-taking under precommitment and direct choice trials in each trial-order between-groups conditions (Direct Choice First,
Precommitment First, Intermittent Precommitment)
Direct choice Precommitment
25 ﬁrst trials 25 last trials 50 trials 25 ﬁrst trials 25 last trials 50 trials
Conditions M sd M sd M sd M sd M sd M sd
Direct Choice First 1473 528 1428 515 1451 521 1474 748 1180 609 1325 678
Precommitment First 1218 696 1071 768 1146 732 1195 649 931 538 1061 593
Intermittent Precommitment 1290 776 1339 706 1313 741 983 647 1059 676 1064 662
M = mean; sd = standard deviation.
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BIS/BAS). On the SOGS, no participant reported a score
≥ 4 (which corresponds to probable pathological gam-
bling). Moreover, only 4 participants reported gambling
once or more a week (playing cards for money or betting
on the lottery). These results are depicted in Table 1. We
observed no signiﬁcant correlation between BIS/BAS
(reward sensitivity subscale), SOGS, and age (all p > .061).
Risk-taking under precommitment vs. direct choice
Mixed-model ANOVA was used with the type of trials
(direct choice vs. precommitment) and times (25 ﬁrst trials
vs. 25 last trials) as a within-subjects factor; trials succes-
sion conditions (DCF vs. PF vs. IP) as a between-subjects
factor; and scores of risk-taking as a dependent measure (see
Table 2 for descriptive statistics). These analyses revealed a
main effect of the type of trials, F(1,59) = 6.89, p = .011,
η2 = .11, indicating that risk-taking was lower during the
precommitment trials than during the direct choice trials
(see Figure 2). We also observed a main effect of Time,
F(1,59) = 4.09, p = .048, η2 = .07, indicating that risk-
taking was lower in the last 25 trials for both precommit-
ment and direct choice trials. There was no main effect of
the trials’ succession conditions and no interaction effect
between the type of trials, time and the trials’ succession
conditions (all p > .25).
We observed no signiﬁcant correlation between risk-
taking (for both 25 ﬁrst and 25 last trials of the direct
choice and precommitment conditions) and individual vari-
ables (BIS/BAS, SOGS, and age; all p > .22). Independent
sample t-tests revealed that gender had no signiﬁcant effect
on risk-taking (all p > .14).
Complementary analyses: Risk-taking within
precommitment trials
Additional analyses were undertaken within precommitment
trials (n = 50) in order to examine the average of risk-taking
when choosing under the crossed-out situation versus under
the situation in which the four amounts were available.
ANOVA was undertaken with the type of situation faced
during the precommitment trials (choice with four options vs.
choices with the two less risky options) as a within-subjects
factor; trials succession conditions (DCF vs. PF vs. IP) as a
between-subjects factor; and scores of risk-taking as a depen-
dent measure (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics). These
analyses revealed no signiﬁcant main effect of the type of
situations faced (p = .12), the trial order conditions (p = .33),
and no interaction effect between the type of situations and the
trial order conditions (p = .63). On precommitment trials,
participants opted to restrict their options on 54.2% of trials
(mean 27.1 of the 50 precommitment trials).
Association between sensitivity to reward/punishment and
risk-taking
Pearson correlation analyses have been undertaken
separately for the DCF, the PF, and the IP conditions, for
both the precommitment trials and the direct choice trials.
Results showed that sensitivity for punishment (scores on
the BIS subscale of the BIS/BAS) was negatively correlated
with risk-taking during the direct choice trials in the
DCF condition (n = 20; r = −.53, p = .015) but not in
the PF condition (n = 20; r = .28, p = .22), neither in the
IP condition (n = 20; r = −.043, p = .86). No signiﬁcant
correlation was observed with self-reported scores of sensi-
tivity to punishment and risk-taking during the precommit-
ment trials. No signiﬁcant correlation was observed with
self-reported scores of sensitivity to reward (scores on the
BAS reward sensitivity subscale of the BIS/BAS).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, monetary risk-taking was reduced
when participants had the opportunity to precommit to their
forthcoming gamble, that is, to make a binding choice that
turned high-risk option unavailable for choice compared to a
direct choice where this option was not presented. Impor-
tantly, within precommitment trials, participants were not
less risky after restricting compared to when electing to face
the four options.
This ﬁnding suggests that risk-taking was not mode-
rated by precommitment per se (i.e., deciding to face the
Figure 2. Average score of risk-taking (range = 100–4000) for the
Direct Choice and the Precommitment trials
Table 3. Risk-taking under precommitment trials, when choosing
to face the crossed-out situation (with the two riskier options
unavailable for choosing) and under the non-crossed-out situation
(with the four amounts available for choosing), separately for the
Direct Choice First, Precommitment First, and Intermittent
Precommitment conditions
Crossed-out Non-crossed-out
M sd M sd
Direct Choice First 1358 302 1438 354
Precommitment First 1336 252 1380 209
Intermittent Precommitment 1492 402 1535 419
M = mean; sd = standard deviation.
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“crossed-out” situations), but rather by enforcing a “pre-
commitment-oriented” break before deciding. Hence, pre-
commitment could impact self-control at a deliberative stage
(i.e., when the agent forms a judgment as to what action is
best; Dill & Holton, 2014; Vohs et al., 2008), and in turn
enhance one’s ability to exert self-control in choosing (i.e., a
volitional stage of self-control) and executing (i.e., an
implemental stage of self-control) an action (for a detailed
description of these three stages of self-control, see Dill &
Holton, 2014). This assumption is in line with recent brain-
imaging ﬁndings (Crockett et al., 2013), which highlighted
higher brain activation within the lateral frontopolar cortex
(a brain region notably involved in prospective valua-
tion and counterfactual thinking; Burgess, Dumontheil, &
Gilbert, 2007; Tsujimoto, Genovesio, & Wise, 2011) while
people had to decide whether to precommit or not their
forthcoming choice toward a larger-later reward rather than
a smaller-sooner reward. Hence, this pre-choice “precom-
mitment-oriented” period may have triggered prospective
(“look-ahead”) reﬂective processes allowing to compute and
to compare expected values attached to speciﬁc alternatives
or courses of action. Nevertheless, the observed decrease
of risk-taking under precommitment trials could be also
explained by alternative and/or complementary mechan-
isms. For instance, crossing out the two higher bet options
during the ﬁrst phase of each precommitment trial (i.e.,
deciding whether to commit a forthcoming choice; see also
Figure 1) might have lowered the perceptual motivational
value of those bets. Moreover, in the present design, the bet
options were not shown an equal amount of time under
direct choice and precommitment trials. Hence, diminished
risk-taking under precommitment trials might also be due to
the enhanced bet choice delay. Indeed, recent studies
showed that monetary risk-taking is diminished when im-
posing a delay before the next bet, as compared to a situation
in which participants could bet directly (Newman et al.,
1987; Thompson & Corr, 2013, 2014). Thus, in this context,
precommitment trials might have maximized the opportu-
nity for a “cooling off” period, allowing one to decide in a
more rational – less emotionally oriented – way (Ladouceur
et al., 2012; Nower & Blaszczynski, 2010). Future studies
are needed to address these issues in order to gain more
insight on alternative mechanisms that could further explain
diminished risk-taking under precommitment.
We also observed that the degree of risk-taking decreased
throughout the task, and independently of trial types. This
ﬁnding is consistent with previous studies on risk-taking
(Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2102) and suggests
that participants learned to be more cautious in their choices
after having experienced several wins and losses. The effect
of time also indicates that precommitment had an effect on
risk-taking at both the earlier and latter phases of the
gambling task (i.e., when the participant had more insight on
the value associated with each option). In other words, this
ﬁnding suggests that precommitment might impact on both
decision-making under ambiguity (i.e., situations with miss-
ing information on the reward/loss probability) and deci-
sion-making under risk (which offers full information on
reward and loss associated with a choice option). Neverthe-
less, additional studies are needed to speciﬁcally address this
question (e.g., by comparing a condition in which exact
probabilities are revealed and a condition with missing
information on reward/loss probability).
Sensitivity to punishment was negatively associated with
risk-taking only for the direct choice trials of the “Direct
Choice First” (DCF) condition. Thus, low sensitivity to
punishment led to higher monetary risk-taking during an
initial phase of non-restricted gambling (i.e., the 50 direct
choice trials of the DCF condition), but not during gamb-
ling characterized by intermittent phase of precommitment
(i.e., the Intermittent Precommitment condition), or when
the phase of non-restricted gambling occurred after a phase
of gambling with precommitment (i.e., the Precommit-
ment First condition). In addition, there was no association
between sensitivity to punishment and risk-taking during the
precommitment trials, which suggests that punishment sen-
sitivity may have no impact on risk-taking when people
are given the opportunity to precommit their forthcoming
choice. This ﬁnding also conﬁrms the construct validity of
our gambling task.
A main limitation of the present study is that it does not
include any measure of the emotional responses triggered
by the action of gambling throughout the task (e.g., using
online psychophysiological or functional imaging mea-
sures). In other words, we do not know if the observed
impact of precommitment on risk-taking is either hampered
or enhanced by the participants’ emotional involvement
while gambling. Moreover, we did not control for the impact
of previous decision outcome (loss vs. rewards) on the
participants’ subsequent decision. Indeed, decision-making
involving independent events is often biased by prior out-
comes. For instance, individuals are often more risk-seeking
after losing than after winning a gamble (e.g., Xue, Lu,
Levin, & Bechara, 2011), a pattern which is often referred to
as the “gambler’s fallacy” (Laplace, 1820). Hence, future
studies are needed in order to speciﬁcally examine whether
previous choice outcomes modulate the impact of precom-
mitment on monetary risk-taking. One option would be to
use a controlled task that allows manipulating both prior
outcomes and subsequent trials (e.g., precommitment trial
vs. direct choice trial involving the same bet options; for an
example of a task design, see Xue, Lu, Levin, & Bechara,
2010 and Xue et al., 2011).
While these ﬁndings remain preliminary, it has some
potential clinical relevance. First, the induction of precom-
mitment-oriented thinking could be an effective strategy to
ration access to “vices” during online gambling, such as
sport betting. This contemporary and increasingly popular
form of gambling affords fast sequential betting (e.g., to
bet on different games occurring simultaneously; to bet
on forthcoming events of an ongoing game) using one or
multiple online betting platforms. In this context, one could
beneﬁt from sequential inductions of precommitment-
oriented strategy to ration access to “vices”. This calls for
research on precommitment using more ecological designs.
Second, present ﬁndings suggest that precommitment might
diminish the impact of sensitivity to punishment on mone-
tary risk-taking. Hence, it could be that precommitment
diminishes risk-taking in individuals with low level of
punishment sensitivity, such as pathological gamblers
and casino gamblers in particular (Goudriaan, Oosterlaan,
de Beurs, & van den Brink, 2005; van Holst, van den Brink,
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Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010). Nevertheless, it remains to
examine whether the observed effect of precommitment on
monetary risk-taking generalizes to a sample of gamblers,
which has both extreme ends of the spectrum of gambling
disorder well represented. For instance, with regard to pro-
active motor response inhibition, recent evidence showed
that occasionally stopping a response decreases monetary
risk-taking in low-problem gamblers but not in high-
problem gamblers (Stevens et al., 2015). Thus, future stu-
dies are needed to examine whether precommitment has
an impact on monetary risk-taking during more ecological
gambling situations and in participants who are used to
behave in such context (i.e., frequent/problem gamblers).
Another interesting question to examine is whether precom-
mitment could help one at stopping his/her gambling ses-
sion. One option would be to use a paradigm in which the
gambler has some levels of agency on the decision to
continue or stop his/her gambling session (e.g., to have the
opportunity to precommit the number of trials to play).
Ultimately, this line of research might result in the devel-
opment of new strategies that would enhance gamblers’
capacity to control their gambling, rather than cease it,
which is relevant to gamblers generally.
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